When Governance Fails: Why Strategic Command Should Never Own Tactical Risk in Football Policing

I’ve sat in the Force Major Events Unit Inspectors chair for years and worn the Silver Commander tabard on countless match days. I’ve had to yank the chain of enthusiastic Club Liaison Officers when risk-based decision-making drifted from protocol in the planning units, and then needed to rely on those same officers as invaluable assets when plans hit the ground. I’ve also spent years at the SAG table in a major events city as Operational Chief Inspector, Silver Commander, and Partnerships CI so I have some experience of how these forums work and, more importantly, what they don’t do.

That’s why when I see a Chief Constable apologising to Parliament over an AI-generated intelligence error tied to a European fixture, I know the real story isn’t about technology. It’s about governance discipline, command integrity, and the misuse of structures that were never designed for this purpose.

This is a good case study of how strategic overreach and binary thinking can derail a system built to manage complexity. And if you work in events, safety, or public order, you need to understand why this matters, because LinkedIn is full of commentary from people who might not.

The Context

The Aston Villa vs Maccabi Tel Aviv UEFA fixture in November 2025 was never going to be a routine Category B game. Two risk vectors collided: the traditional disorder risk between rival fans and the geopolitical tension surrounding Israel and Gaza. That backdrop brought protest dynamics, community reassurance, and hate-crime considerations into play, all issues that sit squarely in the strategic lane.

The Safety Advisory Group (SAG) process became the vehicle for a blunt outcome: no away fans. The club issued a statement citing police advice and SAG agreement, and Maccabi declined tickets amid a toxic atmosphere. On paper, that looks decisive. In reality, it exposed a failure of governance.

How It Should Work

When we talk about football fixtures, the safety framework is largely self-contained. The Green Guide (Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds) sets the benchmark for stadium design, capacity calculations, stewarding ratios, and crowd management principles. The Stadium Safety Certificate, issued by the local authority under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (and the 1987 Act for regulated stands), is the legal backbone for match-day operations.



The Club Safety Officer is the named individual responsible for implementing the certificate conditions and ensuring compliance inside the venue. Their role is pivotal as they own the operational safety plan for the stadium environment. This system means that for football, most safety governance is embedded within the club-police-local authority triangle. It’s structured, tested, and repeatable.

By contrast, the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) was created to provide a multi-agency forum for events that fall outside these established frameworks, things like concerts, festivals, parades, and large-scale gatherings where there’s no permanent infrastructure or safety certificate. SAG brings together police, fire, ambulance, local authority, and sometimes transport and licensing teams.

Its purpose is advisory, designed to help the local authority discharge its duties under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act and related legislation, and to ensure event organisers meet their obligations under health and safety law. SAG typically references the Purple Guide (Event Safety Guide), which covers temporary structures, crowd dynamics, welfare, and contingency planning for non-stadium events. In short, SAG exists because not every event has the embedded governance that football does. It’s there to create a structured conversation where none exists.

SAG was born out of major incidents and inquiries, think Hillsborough, Bradford, and later crowd safety failures at non-sporting events. The idea was simple: if multiple agencies talk early, risks get managed before they become headlines. It’s about coordination and assurance, not command and control. On paper, SAG is advisory, but in reality, it makes the decisions on licensing, and licensing is usually the ultimate green or red light for an event.

To pretend SAG doesn’t make decisions is naïve. Police influence SAG outcomes, of course they do, especially when public safety is at stake and that influence is not improper; it’s part of the duty to protect life.

However, SAG is not the operational engine for football policing. In all my years as Silver, I never attended SAG for a football match because the planning cycle sits elsewhere: inside the football policing framework, with the Football Policing Unit, club safety officer, and liaison roles driving categorisation and resourcing.

SAG might be referenced for context in major events, but using it as the primary vehicle for a binary decision, like banning away fans, is unusual and problematic. When this system works properly, it prevents strategic overreach and ensures decisions are made by those who do this week in, week out.

Categorisation, whether Category B or as in this case C(IR) should flow from structured intelligence assessments, not political optics or headline pressure. Gold sets the tone, Silver owns the risk, Bronze delivers the plan. That separation is non-negotiable.

What Likely Went Wrong

This wasn’t just about AI, it was a convergence of structural weaknesses and process gaps:

1. Intelligence Assurance Breakdown An AI-generated reference to a fictitious “West Ham v Maccabi” match entered an intelligence product and influenced categorisation. That suggests a failure in source evaluation and audit controls. Intelligence doctrine requires 5x5x5 (in my day) grading, handling conditions, and validation before operational use. Skipping those steps allowed unverified material to shape risk decisions.

2. Role Ambiguity and Command Drift Gold’s strategic remit appears to have hardened into a binary outcome, no away fans. Whether that was direct instruction or perceived pressure, it bypassed Silver’s tactical planning and risk ownership. Under GSB, Silver owns operational risk; when that clarity blurs, accountability collapses.

3. SAG as a Decision Vehicle SAG is designed for advisory coordination, not unilateral enforcement. Its strength lies in collaborative problem-solving and exploring mitigations like controlled allocations or enhanced stewarding. Using SAG as the rubber stamp for a binary restriction undermines its purpose and creates the perception of governance by optics rather than doctrine.

4. Political and Community Pressure The geopolitical backdrop amplified scrutiny and risk aversion. In such contexts, strategic leaders often feel compelled to “over-assure” stakeholders. That pressure can distort proportionality and lead to decisions that prioritise optics over operational nuance.

The Chief Constable’s resignation likely reflects cumulative leadership accountability rather than a single tactical misstep. Vicarious liability for public safety sits at the top, but the execution chain here shows systemic failure, not just one person acting alone.

Why This Matters

This matters because the debate unfolding online shows how little many people understand about the realities of decision-making in high-risk environments. It’s easy to say “SAG shouldn’t make decisions” or “police overreached” when you’ve never been the person carrying legal responsibility for public safety. The truth is, these forums and command structures exist for a reason: they provide checks, balance, and a framework for proportionate decisions under pressure.

What happened here illustrates how those frameworks can be bent when political, operational, and reputation pressures collide. SAG was likely used as the mechanism for a binary outcome, and that’s unusual. Licensing decisions ultimately sit with the local authority, and I would expect the Chief Executive had their conversations behind the scenes. But when governance processes are stretched beyond their intended purpose, the safeguards that keep decisions defensible start to erode.

For event professionals, the takeaway is simple: understand the difference between advisory influence and operational command, and appreciate the weight of accountability that sits on those making the calls. Until you’ve carried that responsibility for tens of thousands of lives, it’s hard to grasp the nuance. This case isn’t about AI—it’s about how governance integrity matters most when the stakes are highest.

Closing thoughts

Every major event and every football fixture brings its own dynamics. SAGs vary in approach, clubs differ in culture, and personalities at senior levels can shape decisions in ways that aren’t always visible from the outside. These are shifting sands, and that’s why conversations about governance and command need empathy as much as expertise.

The aim here isn’t to criticise—it’s to share insight from experience. When you’ve spent years in command roles and around SAG tables, you learn that the theory and the reality don’t always align. What matters is keeping decisions proportionate, defensible, and rooted in collaboration.

If you’re planning a large event, navigating complex safety requirements, or simply want a confidential sounding board, Hendersons offers that perspective. With over two decades of major event experience, more than half in command roles, we can act as your critical friend, review plans, or provide advisory input when it matters most. Sometimes, having someone who understands the weight of those decisions makes all the difference.